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Abstract
We introduce a quantum cloning bound which we apply to a straight-
forward and relatively direct security proof of the prepare-and-measure
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) pro-
tocol against collective attacks. The approach we propose is able to
handle the practical problem of source and detector alignment impre-
cisions in a simple way. Specifically, we derive a keyrate bound for
a BB84 implementation in which Alice’s source emits four given but
arbitrary pure states, where the usual equivalence between prepare-
and-measure and entanglement-based QKD no longer applies. Our
result is similar to a keyrate derived by Marøy et al. [Phys. Rev. A
82, 032337 (2010)] and generally an improvement over the keyrate de-
rivable from the entropic uncertainty relation in situations where it
applies. We also provide a stronger result for a source emitting ar-
bitrary qubit states, and a further improved result if the detector is
additionally assumed two dimensional.
∗Erik.Woodhead@ulb.ac.be
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is an approach to the problem of gener-
ating a cryptographic key and disseminating it securely between its intended
recipients. The general advantage of QKD is that it permits the security of
a key to be certified based only on the laws of physics, in particular lim-
itations inherent to quantum physics, rather than assumptions about the
computational power of a potential adversary.
There are two related classes of QKD implementation considered in the
literature: the entanglement-based approach [2], in which the secret key is
generated by joint measurements on a shared entangled state, and “prepare-
and-measure” QKD [1], in which one party (“Alice”) prepares states and
transmits them to another (“Bob”). A simple well-known argument [3]
establishes a correspondence between entanglement-based protocols and a
restricted class of prepare-and-measure protocols in which the source states
satisfy a condition of basis independence [4] (where the average of the source
states is the same in the different bases used).
While this argument has played an important role in the development of
security proofs, it also has its limitations. Real world QKD implementa-
tions are subject to various practical issues, including imperfections in the
devices, which can lead to a false certification of security if not accounted
for in the security analysis [5]. In particular, most experimental and com-
mercially available QKD implementations are of the prepare-and-measure
variety. In this case the states used in the implementation will not form
orthogonal bases and will inevitably deviate from the basis-independence
condition due to the limited accuracy of the source. Consequently, secur-
ity proofs of entanglement-based QKD protocols accounting for arbitrary
detector alignment imprecisions – such as the recent security proofs of the
entanglement-based Bennett-Brassard (BB84) BB84 protocol based on en-
tropic uncertainty relations [6–8] – do not translate to security proofs ac-
counting for all possible source alignment flaws in the prepare-and-measure
setting.
A few security proofs of the prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol have tackled
this issue based on a reduction to an equivalent virtual protocol [9–11].
In this virtual protocol, Alice’s bit and basis choices are effectively both
determined by the outcome of a single four-outcome measurement on an
entangled “coin” state that must be partially or fully characterised and pre-
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pared by Alice. Conceptually, this differs from security analyses of genuine
entanglement-based QKD protocols, which assume the entangled state is
prepared by an adversary and unknown to the legitimate parties apart from
what they can deduce about it via their measurement results.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to this problem in which
we abandon the use of entangled states altogether. We show that a straight-
forward and relatively direct asymptotic security proof of the prepare-and-
measure BB84 protocol against collective attacks is possible based on an
appropriate characterisation of the limitations of quantum cloning. The no-
cloning theorem [12, 13], which implies that an eavesdropper cannot copy
non-orthogonal states without disturbing them in a visible way, is often con-
sidered the intuitive basis for the security of QKD. This intuitive connection
was noted in the original proposal of Bennett and Brassard [1], and is fur-
ther discussed in [14]. The approach of studying the prepare-and-measure
BB84 protocol “directly” was followed in some early generic security ana-
lyses [15, 16], including the original security proof of BB84 against individual
attacks [17], though has seen little development following Shor and Preskill’s
security proof based on entanglement distillation [18].
As our main result, we derive a secret keyrate for a BB84 implementation
in which the source emits four given but arbitrary pure states and which is
largely device independent on Bob’s side. Our end result is comparable to
the keyrate derived by Marøy et al. [11] which, to our knowledge, is the only
previous analysis that establishes security under such relaxed conditions.
Specifically, we recover the same keyrate as Marøy et al. if the two z-basis
source states are emitted with equal probability, but show that it can be
improved in the case of a biased source.
While it is interesting to have a security result that holds for arbitrary
source states, there are situations of practical interest where these states
are naturally qubits. This is the case if, for instance, Alice encodes her
basis and bit choices in the form of different photon polarisation states. In
such an implementation, the source states may still span a Hilbert space of
more than two dimensions in practice if, for example, an attenuated laser
is used to produce low intensity coherent states. Anticipating that this
complication is probably best addressed with the decoy-state method [19,
20], as a second main result we also present an improved keyrate bound for
a source emitting arbitrary qubit states. If we additionally assume Bob’s
detector measurements are two dimensional, we find that we can further
improve our result to the point that, if no errors are observed, we obtain an
asymptotic keyrate of 1.
3
1.2 Outline of scenario and main results
We imagine Alice possesses a source which, depending on a choice of bit and
“basis”, emits one of four different quantum states which is sent to Bob.
Throughout this paper we will consistently call the two “z-basis” states |α〉
and |α′〉, and the two “x-basis” states |β〉 and |β′〉 (note that this nomen-
clature is not intended to imply that these states are necessarily really the
σz and σx eigenstates). We denote the corresponding density operators by
ρ = |α〉〈α|, ρ′ = |α′〉〈α′|, σ = |β〉〈β|, and σ′ = |β′〉〈β′|. Following a unitary
attack by a potential eavesdropper (“Eve”), these states are contained in
some Hilbert space HA ⊂ HB ⊗HE, where HB and HE respectively denote
the Hilbert spaces accessible to Bob and Eve. Upon reception of the states
emitted by Alice, Bob performs one of two binary-outcome measurements
(a “z-basis” or “x-basis” measurement, though we do not assume Bob is ne-
cessarily measuring σz or σx) in order to compute his version of the raw key.
Alice and Bob then sacrifice a subset of their results in order to estimate
the z- and x-basis bit error rates δz and δx, and if these are not too high,
extract a secret key by error correction and privacy amplification.
We consider the common variant of BB84 where only the z-basis results are
used to generate the key. In this case, for an unbiased source an application
of the Devetak-Winter bound [21] yields a lower bound on the asymptotic
secret keyrate r which depends only on the fidelity F (ρE, ρ
′
E) between the
parts of the z-basis states accessible to the eavesdropper:
r ≥ 1− h(12 + 12F (ρE, ρ′E))− h(δz) . (1)
In this expression, the fidelity is defined by F (ρ, σ) = ‖√ρ√σ‖1 where ‖ · ‖1
denotes the trace norm, h(x) = −x log(x)− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary
entropy, all logarithms are in base 2, and subscripts indicate partial tracing
in the usual way (e.g. ρE = TrB[ρ]). Bounding the keyrate is then reduced to
lower bounding F (ρE, ρ
′
E). Alice and Bob, by contrast, may lower bound the
trace distances D(ρB, ρ
′
B) and D(σB, σ
′
B) in terms of the observed bit error
rates via the Helstrom bound [22]: D(ρB, ρ
′
B) ≥ |1 − 2δz| and D(σB, σ′B) ≥
|1 − 2δx|, where we define the trace distance by D(ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ − σ‖1. Our
derivation is then completed by bounding F (ρE, ρ
′
E) in terms of D(σB, σ
′
B).
Any such bound can be understood as a fundamental limit on the degree to
which quantum states can be cloned.
In general, such a bound will depend on a characterisation of the states |α〉,
|α′〉, |β〉, and |β′〉 emitted by the source. Similar to the authors of [9, 11], we
will consider the case where we are given a “basis overlap” angle θ, which
we define such that√
1 + |sin(θ)| = 12
∣∣〈α|β〉+ 〈α′|β〉+ 〈α|β′〉 − 〈α′|β′〉∣∣ (2)
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wherever the right-hand side is greater than 1. Our main cloning bound
then reads
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ fθ
(
D(σB, σ
′
B)
)
, (3)
with the function fθ defined by
fθ(v) =
{
|sin(θ)|v − |cos(θ)|√1− v2 : v ≥ |cos(θ)|
0 : v ≤ |cos(θ)| , (4)
which provides a lower bound on F (ρE, ρ
′
E) wherever the right-hand side of
(2) is greater than 1.
These are the essential ingredients of our security analysis. Bounding the
keyrate is a matter of applying (3) and D(σB, σ
′
B) ≥ |1 − 2δx| to (1). The
resulting keyrate is then
r ≥ 1− h(12 + 12fθ(|1− 2δx|))− h(δz) . (5)
This coincides with the keyrate given in [11] for the scenario we have outlined
here, though as will be discussed later on, our general approach can lead to
improved keyrates in certain cases, specifically where the source is biased or
is limited to two dimensions and more information about the states is used.
We give a derivation of the asymptotic keyrate bound (1) for an unbiased
source in section 2, as well as a generalisation for a biased source where the
two z-basis states are not emitted with equal probability. We also briefly
comment on the issue of non-asymptotic security, which we mostly leave as
a problem for future work. In section 3, we discuss how an eavesdropper’s
distinguishing power between the two z-basis states, measured in terms of
the fidelity as described above, can be bounded. This includes a proof of
the cloning bound (3) introduced above, a better bound applicable if the
source states are qubits, and a further improved bound if both the source
and detector are two dimensional. We finish with some concluding remarks
and summarise potential directions for future research in section 4.
2 Bounding the keyrate
2.1 Derivation of asymptotic keyrate bound
Assuming an eavesdropper restricted to collective attacks, a lower bound on
the asymptotic secret keyrate that can be securely extracted from Alice’s
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sifted key by one-way error correction and privacy amplification is given by
the Devetak-Winter bound [21]:
r ≥ H(Z | E)−H(Z | Z ′) . (6)
Here, the conditional Shannon entropy H(Z | Z ′) quantifies the key loss
due to error correction, and is upper bounded by h(δz) (with equality in the
typical case of symmetric errors). The conditional von Neumann entropy
H(Z | E) quantifies the amount of key that can be extracted securely by
privacy amplification, which for our purposes we should evaluate on the
classical-quantum state
τZE =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|Z ⊗ ρE + |1〉〈1|Z ⊗ ρ′E) , (7)
where ρ and ρ′ are the z-basis states emitted by Alice, and |0〉Z and |1〉Z
denote the state of a classical register in her possession. The state (7)
expresses the correlation between Alice’s version of the sifted key and the
corresponding quantum states in Eve’s possession.
In order to arrive at (1), we use that H(Z | E) ≥ H(Z | EE′) for any ex-
tension of the state (7) to a larger Hilbert space HZ ⊗HE ⊗HE′ (formally
this follows from the property of strong subadditivity of the von Neumann
entropy). In particular, we use this to replace ρE and ρ
′
E in (7) with purific-
ations |Ψ〉 and |Φ〉 ∈ HE ⊗HE′ . Applying the definition of the conditional
von Neumann entropy, we find
H(Z | E) ≥ H(Z | EE′)
= 1− S[12(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|+ |Φ〉〈Φ|)]
= 1− h[12(1 + |〈Ψ|Φ〉|)] , (8)
where S(ρ) = −Tr[ρ log(ρ)]. Since by Uhlmann’s theorem we can choose
|Ψ〉 and |Φ〉 such that F (ρE, ρ′E) = |〈Ψ|Φ〉|, we find
H(Z | E) ≥ 1− h(12 + 12F (ρE, ρ′E)) , (9)
which completes the derivation of (1). Note that (9) is equivalent to an
analogous bound on the Holevo quantity derived in [23].
In the proof given here, we have made the tacit assumption that Alice emits
the z states |α〉 and |α′〉 with equal probability. If we wish to account for
the possibility of a biased source, as was considered in [11] for instance, then
it is straightforward to adapt the derivation of (1). In particular, if the two
z-basis states are emitted with probabilities p = (1 + ε)/2 and q = (1− ε)/2
respectively, (9) generalises to
H(Z | E) ≥ h(p)− h
[
1
2 +
1
2
√
ε2 + (1− ε2)F (ρE, ρ′E)2
]
. (10)
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Our results will hold essentially unmodified if there is a bias in the x basis,
provided the observed coincidence statistics are used to correctly bound the
trace distance D(σB, σ
′
B). Here we have departed from the approach used
by the authors of [9–11], where any bias in the source was included in their
analogue of our source characterisation (2). This way we obtain a generally
better result. For instance, for an otherwise ideal BB84 implementation and
in the absence of errors, we obtain the best possible keyrate of r = h(p).
2.2 A note on non-asymptotic security
As alluded to above, the Devetak-Winter bound, and consequently the
bound (1) on the keyrate that we will use in the remainder of this paper,
is only guaranteed to hold in the asymptotic limit of an infinitely long key.
In the realistic finite-key case, a finite-key result can be derived based on a
“one shot” version of the Devetak-Winter rate [7] where the main problem
in obtaining a security proof is reduced to lower bounding the conditional
min-entropy Hmin(Z | E) rather than the von Neumann entropy H(Z | E).
To obtain a result that converges asymptotically to the keyrate given by the
Devetak-Winter bound, the min-entropy should ideally be evaluated with
a smoothing parameter, which can roughly be interpreted as a small ad-
ditional probability of failure traded in exchange for a higher keyrate, and
which can be made arbitrarily small in the asymptotic limit. We refer to
[8, 24] for a discussion of the details.
We will leave as a problem for future work how the smooth min-entropy can
be bounded in such a way as to recover (9) asymptotically. We note only
here that the min-entropy (without smoothing) evaluated on the state (7)
has an exact expression in terms of the trace distance:
Hmin(Z | E) = 1− log
(
1 +D(ρE, ρ
′
E)
)
. (11)
This is a special case of the min-entropy’s expression in terms of the guess-
ing probability [25]; we also gave a simple derivation in [26]. Using that
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤
√
1− F (ρE, ρ′E)2, we can alternatively bound the min-entropy
in terms of the fidelity. While the result would be less than optimal and still
limited to collective attacks, it is worth noting that using (11) in place of
(9) would already allow the obtention of finite-key bounds using the general
approach explored in this paper.
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3 Bounding Eve’s distinguishing ability
3.1 Ideal BB84 source
In the special case of an ideal BB84 source, characterised by θ = pi/2, the
general cloning bound (3) reduces to
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ D(σB, σ′B) , (12)
and we recover the famous keyrate r ≥ 1 − h(δx) − h(δz) due to Shor and
Preskill [18]. While the proof of (3) is not complicated, a direct proof of
(12) is especially simple and will serve to introduce our techniques.
In an ideal BB84 implementation, the source states form two mutually un-
biased orthogonal bases, i.e. satisfy
〈α|α′〉 = 〈β|β′〉 = 0 (13)
and, in an appropriate phase convention,
|α〉 = 1√
2
[|β〉+ |β′〉] ,
|α′〉 = 1√
2
[|β〉 − |β′〉] . (14)
Equivalently, one can identify Z = ρ − ρ′ and X = σ − σ′ with the Pauli z
and x operators. With this notation, D(ρB, ρ
′
B) =
1
2‖ZB‖1 and D(σB, σ′B) =
1
2‖XB‖1.
We obtain (12) as follows. Let UB be the (Hermitian) unitary operator
acting on HB such that 12‖XB‖1 = 12 TrB[UBXB]. Then,
D(σB, σ
′
B) =
1
2 TrB[UBXB]
= 12 Tr
[
(UB ⊗ 1E)X
]
= 12
(〈α|UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉+ 〈α′|UB ⊗ 1E|α〉)
= Re
[〈α|UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉]
≤ ∣∣〈α|UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉∣∣ . (15)
Now, |α〉 and |α′〉 are by definition purifications of ρE and ρ′E, and since UB⊗
1E acts nontrivially only on HB, the state UB ⊗ 1E|α′〉 is still a purification
of ρ′E. Thus, by Uhlmann’s theorem, the last line of (15) provides a lower
bound on the fidelity between ρE and ρ
′
E, which concludes our proof.
We conclude this discussion of the ideal BB84 scenario by noting that (12)
can be seen as a strengthened version of a bound originally derived in [17].
Using that D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤
√
1− F (ρE, ρ′E)2, (12) implies
D(ρE, ρ
′
E)
2 +D(σB, σ
′
B)
2 ≤ 1 . (16)
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Although not given in this form, Fuchs et al. effectively derived this rela-
tion as an intermediate result in their security proof of the BB84 protocol
against individual attacks (specifically, (16) is essentially equivalent to equa-
tions (23) and (24) in [17]).
3.2 Arbitrary source states
We now derive (3). Our starting point is the quantity
∆ = 1
2
√
2
(〈α|β〉+ 〈α′|β〉+ 〈α|β′〉 − 〈α′|β′〉) . (17)
Note that (17) as expressed above is dependent on physically irrelevant phase
factors (e.g. |α〉 and eiφ|α〉 denote the same state); to obtain the best result,
one should adopt the phase convention that maximises (17), which can then
always be taken to be real.
Let P and Q be orthogonal projectors such that P −Q = U and P +Q = 1,
where U = UB ⊗ 1E is the Hermitian unitary such that 12 Tr[U(σ − σ′)] =
D(σB, σ
′
B), as in the proof of (12). For convenience, we also define the
(generally not normalised) states |α±〉 = (|α〉 ± |α′〉)/
√
2. Then,
2∆ = 〈α+|(P +Q)|β〉+ 〈α−|(P +Q)|β′〉
≤ |〈α+|P |β〉|+ |〈α+|Q|β〉|
+ |〈α−|P |β′〉|+ |〈α−|Q|β′〉| . (18)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality twice on the first and fourth terms
on the right-hand side,
|〈α+|P |β〉|+ |〈α−|Q|β′〉|
≤
√
〈α+|P |α+〉
√
〈β|P |β〉+
√
〈α−|Q|α−〉
√
〈β′|Q|β′〉
≤
√
〈α+|P |α+〉+ 〈α−|Q|α−〉
√
〈β|P |β〉+ 〈β′|Q|β′〉
=
√
1 + Re[〈α|U |α′〉]
√
1 +D(σB, σ′B) . (19)
In a similar manner, |〈α+|Q|β〉| + |〈α−|P |β′〉| provides a lower bound on√
1− Re[〈α|U |α′〉]√1−D(σB, σ′B). We thus obtain
∆ ≤
√
1
2 +
1
2 Re[〈α|U |α′〉]
√
1
2 +
1
2D(σB, σ
′
B)
+
√
1
2 − 12 Re[〈α|U |α′〉]
√
1
2 − 12D(σB, σ′B) , (20)
where Re[〈α|U |α′〉] in turn provides a lower bound on F (ρE, ρ′E), as in the
proof of (12). Substituting ∆ =
√
1 + |sin(θ)|/√2 and rearranging, we
arrive at (3).
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If dimHA = 2 and the source states form two orthogonal bases, then θ as
defined by (2) coincides with the angle separating the bases on the Bloch
sphere. In this particular case, the source is basis independent (i.e. 12ρ+
1
2ρ
′ =
1
2σ +
1
2σ
′), and we note that the keyrate (5) is an improvement over the
keyrate predicted by the uncertainty relation [6, 7], which for comparison is
r ≥ 1− log(1 + |cos(θ)|)− h(δx)− h(δz) . (21)
A simple example demonstrates that the cloning bound (3) is tight. We set
the source states to
|α〉 = cos(γ−θ2 )|0〉A + sin(γ−θ2 )|1〉A ,
|α′〉 = − sin(γ−θ2 )|0〉A + cos(γ−θ2 )|1〉A , (22)
and
|β〉 = cos(γ2)|0〉A + sin(γ2)|1〉A ,
|β′〉 = − sin(γ2)|0〉A + cos(γ2)|1〉A , (23)
where |0〉A and |1〉A are orthogonal. Following the cloning operation
|0〉A 7→ |0〉B|0〉E
|1〉A 7→ |1〉B|1〉E , (24)
we find D(σB, σ
′
B) = |cos(γ)| and F (ρE, ρ′E) = |sin(θ−γ)|. If we take, for in-
stance, angles satisfying 0 ≤ γ ≤ θ ≤ pi/2, then F (ρE, ρ′E) = fθ
(
D(σB, σ
′
B)
)
.
Consequently, the keyrate (5) is the highest that can be derived using the
particular approach we have followed so far – i.e. where the conditional
entropy is bounded via the fidelity using only the x-basis error rate and
given only the state characterisation defined in (2). We describe how better
bounds on the fidelity and conditional entropy can be derived in certain
circumstances of interest in the next sections.
3.3 Qubit source states
We now turn to a more detailed study of qubit sources. It will be convenient
to characterise such a source in terms of three parameters: an angle ϕ
representing the angle between the two bases on the Bloch sphere, and angles
α and β measuring the non-orthogonality of the states constituting each
basis and defined by |sin(α)| = |〈α|α′〉| and |sin(β)| = |〈β|β′〉| respectively.
We set
ρ− ρ′ ∝ Z ,
σ − σ ∝ V , (25)
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with V = cos(ϕ)Z + sin(ϕ)X, and where we can identify Z and X with the
Pauli z and x operators, respectively.
Via results from the preceding section, we already know that
1
2‖XB‖1 ≥ fϕ
(
1
2‖VB‖1
)
, (26)
where the function fϕ is as defined in (4), except that we use the angle ϕ
between the bases in place of the basis overlap angle θ defined in (2). If |α〉
and |α′〉 are orthogonal, i.e. if sin(α) = 0, then according to (12) Eve’s fidelity
is simply bounded by F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ 12‖XB‖1. A natural conjecture one could
consider is that this bound still holds if |α〉 and |α′〉 are non-orthogonal. This
is not the case however: we found counter-examples numerically. Nor is this
an artefact of bounding the fidelity as an intermediate step in bounding the
keyrate, as we likewise found cases where H(Z | E)  1 − h(12 + 14‖XB‖1)
when minimising the conditional von Neumann entropy directly.
A generally valid bound, then, will depend explicitly on the non-orthogonality
measured by the angle α. Specifically, we find
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ gα
(
1
2‖XB‖1
)
(27)
with the function gα defined by
gα(x) =
{
(1 + |sin(α)|)x− |sin(α)| : x ≥ 2|sin(α)|1+|sin(α)|
|sin(α)| : x ≤ 2|sin(α)|1+|sin(α)|
. (28)
Combining (26) and (27), we have
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ gα ◦ fϕ
(
D(σB,σ
′
B)
|cos(β)|
)
, (29)
where we have used that σ − σ′ = cos(β)V . We see here that explicitly
introducing the non-orthogonality of the x-basis states can only improve
the keyrate bound. This is not surprising since the x-basis states are only
used for the purpose of testing the channel. Explicitly writing the resulting
keyrate,
r ≥ 1− h
[
1
2 +
1
2gα ◦ fϕ
( |1−2δx|
|cos(β)|
)]
− h(δz) . (30)
The remainder of this section will be devoted to the determination of the
function gα. First, we set
|α〉 = cos(α2 )|0〉+ eiφ sin(α2 )|1〉 ,
|α′〉 = sin(α2 )|0〉+ eiφ cos(α2 )|1〉 , (31)
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such that 〈α|α′〉 = sin(α) and ρ−ρ′ = cos(α)Z. As in preceding sections, we
define the Hermitian unitary U = UB⊗1E such that 12‖XB‖1 = 12 Tr[UX] =
Re[〈0|U |1〉]. Without loss of generality, we can take the quantity Γ = 〈0|U |1〉
to be real (if necessary, this can be achieved by absorbing its phase into the
phase φ already present in (31)). A lower bound is already given by
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥
∣∣〈α|U |α′〉∣∣ , (32)
however the result this would produce is not optimal. In order to obtain a
better result, note that any unitary of the form U˜B⊗1E can be used in place
of U in (32). In particular, since U is Hermitian, the family of operators
U(γ) = i sin(γ)1 + cos(γ)U (33)
are unitary and satisfy this requirement. Evaluating 〈α|U(γ)|α′〉, we find
〈α|U(γ)|α′〉 = 12 sin(α)
(〈0|U(γ)|0〉+ 〈1|U(γ)|1〉)
+ eiφ cos(α2 )
2〈0|U(γ)|1〉+ e−iφ sin(α2 )2〈1|U(γ)|0〉
= i sin(γ) sin(α) + cos(γ) sin(α)K
+ cos(γ)
(
cos(φ) + i cos(α) sin(φ)
)
Γ , (34)
where we have set K = 12(〈0|U |0〉+ 〈1|U |1〉). Squaring the last line,∣∣〈α|U(γ)|α′〉∣∣2 = cos(γ)2(sin(α)K + cos(φ)Γ)2
+
(
sin(γ) sin(α) + cos(γ) cos(α) sin(φ)Γ
)2
. (35)
Our task now is to maximise this quantity over γ and minimise over possible
values of K and φ. We begin by minimising over K for fixed γ and φ. First,
note that |K|+ Γ ≤ 1 (this can be inferred by evaluating (35) for γ = φ = 0
and α = ±pi/2 and noting that the result should never exceed 1). With this
constraint, we wish to minimise Q = |sin(α)K+ cos(φ)Γ|. If Γ is sufficiently
small, we are able to choose K such that this quantity is zero. Otherwise,
we simply set |K| = 1 − Γ. Calling Q∗ the minimum possible value of
|sin(α)K + cos(φ)Γ|, we have
Q∗ =
{(|sin(α)|+ |cos(φ)|)Γ− |sin(α)| : Γ ≥ |sin(α)||sin(α)|+|cos(φ)|
0 : Γ ≤ |sin(α)||sin(α)|+|cos(φ)| ,
(36)
The next step is the maximisation over γ. Since Q∗ has no dependence on
γ, this is straightforward. For the optimal value γ∗ of γ, we find∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣2 = 12(Q 2∗ + cos(α)2 sin(φ)2Γ2 + sin(α)2)
+ 12
{(
Q 2∗ + cos(α)
2 sin(φ)2Γ2 − sin(α)2)2
+ 4 sin(α)2 cos(α)2 sin(φ)2Γ2
}1/2
. (37)
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Finally, we minimise over φ. For values of φ such that |cos(φ)| ≤ |sin(α)|1−ΓΓ ,
we set Q∗ = 0, and (37) simplifies to∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣2 = sin(α)2 + cos(α)2 sin(φ)2Γ2 . (38)
If Γ ≤ |sin(α)|1+|sin(α)| , then Q∗ = 0 regardless of φ, and the minimum of (38) is∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣ = |sin(α)| . (39)
Otherwise, the minimum of (35) for values of φ where Q∗ = 0 is found by
using the minimum allowed value of |sin(φ)| in (38), which simplifies to∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣ = sin(α)2 + cos(α)2Γ . (40)
If Γ > |sin(α)|1+|sin(α)| , then we must separately consider the range of possible val-
ues of φ for which |cos(φ)| > |sin(α)|1−ΓΓ , where Q∗ = (|sin(α)|+ |cos(φ)|)−
|sin(α)|. We have
Q 2∗ + cos(α)
2 sin(φ)2Γ2 = Y Γ(Y Γ− 2) + 2 cos(α)2Γ + sin(α)2 , (41)
where we have set Y = 1 + |sin(α)||cos(φ)|. Then,∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣2 = sin(α)2 + cos(α)2Γ + 12Y Γ(Y Γ− 2)
+ 12Γ
{(
Y (Y Γ− 2) + 2 cos(α)2)2
+ 4 sin(α)2 cos(α)2 sin(φ)2
}1/2
, (42)
which we can simplify down to∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣2 = sin(α)2 + cos(α)2Γ + 12Y Γ(Y Γ− 2)
+ 12Y Γ
√
(Y Γ− 2)2 + 4 cos(α)2(Γ− 1) . (43)
This is a decreasing function in Y and is therefore minimised by taking
|cos(φ)| = 1, or Y∗ = 1 + |sin(α)|. We find∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣2 = sin(α)2 + cos(α)2Γ
+ 12Y∗Γ
[
Y∗Γ− 2 +
∣∣Y∗Γ− 2|sin(α)|∣∣] . (44)
If Γ ≥ 2|sin(α)|1+|sin(α)| , then the minimum we find is∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣ = (1 + |sin(α)|)Γ− |sin(α)| . (45)
Otherwise, the minimum is simply |sin(α)|. Since (45) is always less than
(40), our final result is
∣∣〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉∣∣ ≥ {(1 + |sin(α)|)Γ− |sin(α)| : Γ ≥ 2|sin(α)|1+|sin(α)||sin(α)| : Γ ≤ 2|sin(α)|1+|sin(α)| . (46)
Recalling that F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ |〈α|U(γ∗)|α′〉| and that we defined Γ = 12‖XB‖1,
this concludes the proof of (27).
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3.4 Qubit source and detector
In most security analyses of the BB84 protocol accounting for device align-
ment errors, including the results derived in sections 3.2 and 3.3, only the
x-basis error rate is used to bound the information an eavesdropper could
have about the key. This leaves open the possibility that we could derive
better results if the z-basis error rate were also used for this purpose. Here,
we will illustrate how such a result can be derived in the case where Alice’s
source emits qubit states and Bob’s detector is assumed to perform two-
dimensional measurements.
As in section 3.3, we take ρ− ρ′ ∝ Z and σ−σ′ ∝ V , where V = cos(ϕ)Z +
sin(ϕ)X, and Z and X can be identified with the Pauli z and x operators.
The error rates provide lower bounds on D(ρB, ρ
′
B) = |cos(α)|12‖ZB‖1 and
D(σB, σ
′
B) = |cos(β)|12‖VB‖1. The main intuition for deriving an improved
keyrate is that, if dimHB = 2, the quantities 12‖ZB‖1, 12‖XB‖1, and 12‖VB‖1
are constrained in the values they can take. Specifically, we will be able to
show that√
1− 14‖VB‖ 21 ≥ |sin(ϕ)|
√
1− 14‖XB‖ 21 − |cos(ϕ)|
√
1− 14‖ZB‖ 21 . (47)
Since we have F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ gα
(
1
2‖XB‖1
)
from (27), (47) provides a second
bound on the fidelity to complement (29). Our end result is similar in form
to (29):
F (ρE, ρ
′
E) ≥ gα ◦ f (2)ϕ
(
D(ρB,ρ
′
B)
|cos(α)| ,
D(σB,σ
′
B)
|cos(β)|
)
, (48)
with the function f
(2)
ϕ defined piecewise by
f (2)ϕ (z, v) =
{
hϕ(z, v) : q(z, v) ≥ |cos(ϕ)|
fϕ(v) : q(z, v) ≤ |cos(ϕ)|
, (49)
in turn with hϕ defined such that
|sin(ϕ)|
√
1− hϕ(z, v)2 =
√
1− v2 + |cos(ϕ)|
√
1− z2 , (50)
fϕ as in (4), and q by
q(z, v) = zv −
√
(1− z2)(1− v2) . (51)
The resulting keyrate is
r ≥ 1− h
[
1
2 +
1
2gα ◦ f (2)ϕ
( |1−2δz |
|cos(α)| ,
|1−2δx|
|cos(β)|
)]
− h(δz) . (52)
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We note that, provided sin(ϕ) 6= 0, if 12‖ZB‖1 = 1 and 12‖VB‖1 = 1 then
(47) implies 12‖XB‖1 = 1. Thus, except in the pathological case where the
z and x bases coincide, if δz = (1 − |cos(α)|)/2 and δx = (1 − |cos(β)|)/2
(the minimum possible error rates) we certify that Bob is in full control of
Alice’s source space and we find H(Z | E) = 1 and r ≥ 1 − h(δz) (i.e. the
only reduction in the keyrate is due to error correction).
We broke (47) numerically in test cases where dimHB > 2. In this respect,
we see that there is an advantage to be gained if some characterisation of
Bob’s detector is introduced in addition to Alice’s source.
We now prove (47). Our strategy will be to derive an upper bound on
1
2‖VB‖1 given 12‖ZB‖1 and 12‖XB‖1, and then invert the resulting bound
for 12‖XB‖1. Where HB is two dimensional, this is especially easy as all
three operators are expressible as combinations of Pauli operators. We set
ZB = z ·σ, XB = x·σ, and VB = v·σ, with ‖z‖, ‖x‖, ‖v‖ ≤ 1. For simplicity
of notation we will generally denote by e.g. a the norm ‖a‖ of a vector a.
Because a = ‖a‖ = 12‖a · σ‖1, deriving the desired bound is reduced to
bounding v in terms of z and x. Using that VB = cos(ϕ)ZB + sin(ϕ)XB, we
have
v = 12‖VB‖1
= 12‖cos(ϕ)ZB + sin(ϕ)XB‖1
= ‖cos(ϕ)z + sin(ϕ)x‖ . (53)
Squaring this and developing,
v2 = 12(z
2 + x2) + 12 cos(2ϕ)(z
2 − x2) + sin(2ϕ)x · z . (54)
Now, while we are working with a given value of ϕ, we can arrive at a
nontrivial bound on v by noting that 12‖cos(ϕ)ZB +sin(ϕ)XB‖1 must be less
than 1 for all values of ϕ. The maximum value of (54), if ϕ is allowed to
take any value, is given by
(vmax)
2 = 12(z
2 + x2) +
√
1
4(z
2 − x2)2 + (x · z)2 . (55)
Requiring that the right-hand side is less than 1, we find
(2− z2 − x2)2 ≥ (z2 − x2)2 + 4(x · z)2 , (56)
which simplifies to
|x · z| ≤
√
(1− z2)(1− x2) . (57)
From this, we deduce that
v2 ≤ 12(z2 + x2) + 12 cos(2ϕ)(z2 − x2) + |sin(2ϕ)|
√
(1− z2)(1− x2) , (58)
15
or equivalently,√
1− v2 ≥ ∣∣|cos(ϕ)|√1− z2 − |sin(ϕ)|√1− x2∣∣ . (59)
Invoking the triangle inequality on (53), we also trivially have
v ≤ |cos(ϕ)|z + |sin(ϕ)|x (60)
and
v ≥ ∣∣|cos(ϕ)|z − |sin(ϕ)|x∣∣ . (61)
Inverting these, we find two lower bounds on x:
|sin(ϕ)|
√
1− x2 ≤
√
1− v2 + |cos(ϕ)|
√
1− z2 (62)
and
|sin(ϕ)|x ≥ ∣∣v − |cos(ϕ)|z∣∣ , (63)
and the bound on x we are seeking is simply whichever is the stronger of
the two, which depends on z and v. Specifically, we should use (62) if
zv −√(1− z2)(1− v2) ≥ |cos(ϕ)|, and (63) otherwise.
Equation (62) is just a rearrangement of (47), and for sufficiently good
bounds on z and v provides a better bound on F (ρE, ρ
′
E) than (27). Equa-
tion (63) by contrast proves to be of little interest as in practice we have
only lower bounds z ≥ z0 and v ≥ v0 on z and v. Because (63) is always a
decreasing function of either z or v, we cannot safely substitute lower bounds
z0 and v0 in their place.
For the sake of completeness, we show here that (62) and (63) together are
no more useful than (62) and (27) in this respect. First, note that we certify
nothing if v0 ≤ |cos(ϕ)|, as this permits v = |cos(ϕ)| and z = 1, for which
both (62) and (63) reduce to x ≥ 0. If v0 > |cos(ϕ)|, then (63) is minimised
by maximising z (i.e. setting z = 1) and minimising v (i.e. setting v = v0).
The lower bound on x implied by (62) is minimised by minimising both z
and v. In both cases we can safely substitute v = v0. If z0 is such that
z0v0 −
√
(1− z 20 )(1− v 20 ) ≥ |cos(ϕ)|, then we simply use z = z0 in (62).
Otherwise, we use z = |cos(ϕ)|v0 + |sin(ϕ)|
√
1− v 20 in either (62) or (63),
which both reduce to x ≥ |sin(ϕ)|v0 − |cos(ϕ)|
√
1− v 20 .
In summary, given lower bounds z0 and v0 on z =
1
2‖ZB‖1 and v = ‖VB‖1
respectively, we have shown that
x = 12‖XB‖1 ≥ f (2)ϕ (z0, v0) , (64)
with the function f
(2)
ϕ defined in (49) above. This concludes the derivation
of (48).
16
4 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to relate the security of the prepare-and-
measure BB84 quantum key distribution protocol in a particularly simple
way to the inherent limits of cloning imposed by quantum physics. In this
respect, our approach is similar to that explored in [6, 7] in that we relate
security as closely as possible to a generic characterisation of the structure of
quantum physics, with our cloning bounds such as (3) playing a role analog-
ous to the uncertainty relations of [6, 7]. Notably, in a departure from recent
security analyses, we see that a much more direct treatment of the prepare-
and-measure scenario is possible; recasting BB84 in its entanglement-based
form is seen not to be a necessary step prior to the analysis.
Our results hold with Bob’s device left largely uncharacterised. Specific-
ally, our results hold wherever the Helstrom bound does, which is at least
wherever Bob’s measurements are separable. We note this is in line with
a trend in recent security analyses featuring automatic “one-sided device
independence” [27]. (See also [28] for a recent security proof of BB84 that
is completely device independent on Bob’s side.)
Our security proof, which is based on the Devetak-Winter bound, holds for
collective attacks, in which the eavesdropper is assumed to attack each qubit
unitarily individually and identically, but may delay her measurements until
after the classical post-processing has been applied. In the case of a BB84
implementation that is basis independent and where Bob’s measurement
devices are memoryless, security against collective attacks implies security
against coherent attacks, as follows for instance from the post-selection tech-
nique of [29]. The status of coherent attacks in more general situations is
still largely unknown, and we leave as an open question how our results
extend in this case.
We have also restricted our analysis to the asymptotic regime (though see
section 2.2). To derive a security proof in the case of finite statistics, it
would be interesting to understand how our approach can be adapted to
bound the smooth min-entropy in a manner that recovers (9) and cloning
bounds such as (3) asymptotically. Additionally, as the main purpose of
this paper is to introduce an alternative approach to understanding QKD
security, we have not attempted to account for all possible issues that should
be accounted for in a truly unconditional security proof of practical QKD.
In particular, for simplicity we have assumed a lossless channel and perfect
detector efficiency. While this restriction can in principle be removed if
Bob adopts the convention of assigning outputs to non-detection events, in
practice the resulting effective error rates would be too high to certify the
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security of a QKD scheme implemented with contemporary technology, and
a better treatment of losses and detector inefficiencies seems desirable. We
refer to [11] for a possible approach treating non-detection as a third possible
outcome.
Finally, following the recent trend of partially or fully device-independent ap-
proaches to QKD [30–32], let us remark that our security proof of BB84 de-
pends, as in [11], on a single parameter θ characterising the quantum devices.
Provided that our techniques generalise to coherent attacks, this parameter
would represent the only feature that has to be trusted in an otherwise
device-independent implementation of BB84. It would be interesting then
to understand how this parameter could be “self tested” under some real-
istic assumptions, hopefully then elevating the prepare-and-measure BB84
protocol to a status competitive with existing partially device-independent
approaches to QKD.
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